AUSTIN,
Texas -- Meanwhile, back in Iraq. I was going to leave out of this column
everything about how we got into Iraq, or whether it was wise, and or
whether the infamous "they" knowingly lied to us. (Although
I did plan to point out I would be nobly refraining from poking at that
pus-riddled question.)
Since I believe one of our greatest strengths as Americans is shrewd practicality,
I thought it was time we moved past the now unhelpful, "How did we
get into his mess?" to the more utilitarian, "What the hell
do we do now?"
However, I cannot let this astounding Downing Street memo go unmentioned.
On May 1, the Sunday Times of London printed a secret memo that went to
the defense secretary, foreign secretary, attorney general and other high
officials. It is the minutes of their meeting on Iraq with Tony Blair.
The memo was written by Matthew Rycroft, a Downing Street foreign policy
aide. It has been confirmed as legitimate and is dated July 23, 2002.
I suppose the correct cliche is "smoking gun."
"C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible
shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted
to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction
of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed
around the policy. (There it is.) The NSC (National Security Council)
had no patience with the U.N. route, and no enthusiasm for publishing
material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in
Washington of the aftermath after military action."
After some paragraphs on tactical considerations, Rycroft reports, "No
decisions had been taken, but he (British defense secretary) thought the
most likely timing in U.S. minds for military action to begin was January,
with the timeline beginning 30 days before the U.S. congressional elections.
"The foreign secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell
this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military
action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin.
Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less
than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for
an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the U.N. weapons inspectors. This
would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
"The attorney general said that the desire for regime change was
not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal
bases: self-defense, humanitarian intervention or UNSC authorization.
The first and second could not be the base in this case."
There is much more in the memo, which can be found easily online. What's
difficult now is placing the memo in the timeframe. Can you remember how
little you knew about a war with Iraq in July 2002? Most of us who opposed
the war concluded some time ago this was the way it went down. There was
plenty of evidence, though nothing this direct and cold. Think of the
difference it would have made if we had known all this three years ago.
Now? The memo was a huge story in Britain but is almost unreported here.
The memo does get us some forwarder. At least it finally settles this
ridiculous debate about how Dear Leader Bush just wanted to bring democracy
all along and we did it all for George Washington.
Enough said. What to do? Now that we're there, at least we're on the right
side, not even withstanding the disgusting Ahmed Chalabi as oil minister.
Unfortunately, our very support for the good guys is making it much harder
for them. A tactical Catch-22. I was impressed by the premise of Reza
Aslan's new book, "No God but God," which is that all of Islam
is undergoing a struggle between the modernists and the traditionalists,
between reformers and reactionaries.
But in Iraq, which already had a secular state, we have the additional
complication of sectarian/ethnic divisions -- your Sunnis, your Shiites,
your Kurds -- not to mention, the tribalism within those divisions. (Am
I bitter enough to point out once again that Paul Wolfowitz said under
oath, "There is no history ethnic strife in Iraq"? You bet your
ass I am.)
Our most basic problem in-country is that having the U.S. of A. on your
side automatically makes you about as popular as a socialist in the Texas
Legislature: We are working against the guys we want to win by supporting
them. This requires some serious skulling but is not, in politics, all
that unusual a pickle.
There is a political solution. Like all politics, it requires a deal.
What about letting the interim government make a deal with the Sunnis
for us to withdraw -- as in, "You cooperate with us, and we'll get
the Americans out of here for you." We can't make that deal, but
the Iraqis can.
